The Magnitude and Extent of Malfeasance on Unproctored Internet–Based Tests of Cognitive Ability and Personality by Glaze, Ryan M.
  
 
 
 
THE MAGNITUDE AND EXTENT OF MALFEASANCE ON UNPROCTORED 
INTERNET–BASED TESTS OF COGNITIVE ABILITY AND PERSONALITY 
 
 
A Thesis 
by 
RYAN MATTHEW GLAZE 
 
 
Submitted to the Office of Graduate Studies of 
Texas A&M University 
in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of  
MASTER OF SCIENCE 
 
 
August 2009 
 
 
Major Subject: Psychology 
  
 
 
 
THE MAGNITUDE AND EXTENT OF MALFEASANCE ON UNPROCTORED 
INTERNET–BASED TESTS OF COGNITIVE ABILITY AND PERSONALITY 
 
A Thesis 
by 
RYAN MATTHEW GLAZE 
 
Submitted to the Office of Graduate Studies of 
Texas A&M University 
in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of  
MASTER OF SCIENCE 
 
Approved by: 
Chair of Committee,  Winfred Arthur, Jr. 
Committee Members, David Martin 
 Stephanie Payne 
Head of Department, Leslie Morey 
 
 
August 2009 
 
Major Subject: Psychology 
  
iii 
ABSTRACT 
 
The Magnitude and Extent of Malfeasance on Unproctored Internet–Based Tests of 
Cognitive Ability and Personality. (August 2009) 
Ryan Matthew Glaze, B.A., The University of Oklahoma 
Chair of Advisory Committee: Dr. Winfred Arthur, Jr. 
 
The use of unproctored internet–based testing for employee selection is 
widespread. Although this mode of testing has advantages over onsite testing, 
researchers and practitioners continue to be concerned about potential malfeasance (e.g., 
cheating and response distortion) under high–stakes conditions. Therefore, the primary 
objective of the present study was to investigate potential malfeasance effects on the 
scores of an unproctored internet–based cognitive ability, and a personality test. This 
was accomplished by implementing a within–subjects design in which test takers first 
completed the tests as job applicants (high–stakes) or incumbents (low–stakes) then as 
research participants (low–stakes). The pattern of cognitive ability test score differences 
was more consonant with a psychometric practice effect than a malfeasance explanation. 
Thus, the results suggest that, if present, there was no evidence to indicate that wide–
scale or systematic malfeasance unduly affected the test scores. This may have been due 
to the speeded nature of the test, which was used to preempt the potential for widespread 
cheating. Additionally, the unproctored personality administration resulted in similar 
mean shifts and similar proportions of test takers being suspected of distorting their 
  
iv 
responses as that reported in the extant literature for proctored tests. In their totality, 
these results suggest that an unproctored internet–based administration does not uniquely 
threaten personality measures in terms of elevated levels of response distortion 
compared to proctored measures. 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 Since the 1920s, psychological testing has played a definitive role in the field of 
industrial/organizational (I/O) psychology by increasing the match between employee 
characteristics and job requirements (Benjamin & Baker, 2004). Considerable research 
attention has led to substantial contributions to the understanding of selection tests 
(Arthur & Benjamin, 1999). Although, a review of the selection test literature is outside 
the scope of this thesis, reviews are available elsewhere (e.g., Sackett & Lievens, 2008). 
Previous reviews have focused on traditional methods of administering selection tests 
(e.g., paper–and–pencil tests). However, researchers and practitioners are beginning to 
realize the impact of technology on selection testing resulting in the increasing use of 
unproctored internet–based tests. Consequently, the objectives of the current study are to 
(a) review the extant unproctored internet–based testing literature, and (b) investigate 
potential malfeasance effects on the scores of unproctored internet–based tests of 
cognitive ability and personality. 
Technology in Selection Testing 
As the role of technology in I/O psychology grows, the advantages and 
disadvantages of using computer–based testing continue to garner research attention. 
Initial research in this domain focused on the measurement equivalency concerns when 
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converting paper–and–pencil tests to computer–based tests. These concerns have since 
largely been resolved; it would seem that computer administration does not threaten the 
construct validity of said tests (Booth–Kewley, Edwards, & Rosenfeld, 1992; Mead, & 
Drasgow, 1993; Potosky & Bobko, 2004; Richman, Kiesler, Wiesband, & Drasgow, 
1999). Subsequently, the personnel selection testing literature is now focused on issues 
brought about by internet–based testing which is a logical extension of computer–based 
testing.  
Unproctored Internet–Based Testing 
 The advantages of internet–based testing build on the utility of computer–based 
testing (Baron & Austin, 2000; McBride, 1998), and can be characterized as improving 
the efficiency of delivery. Thus, like computer–based testing, internet–based testing may 
ensure that every test taker receives the same instructions, precise timing, and accurate 
scoring. In addition, internet–based testing also permits the easy incorporation of 
modifications and updates into existing systems (Tippins et al., 2006). However, one 
advantage of internet–based testing over computer–based testing is its ability to be 
paired with internet–based recruitment systems allowing applicants to search and apply 
for jobs from any location with internet access at any time. This “test anywhere–
anytime” approach has many advantages. From an applicant perspective, the ease of 
searching and applying for jobs online reduces the motivation and resources required to 
engage in such behaviors by reducing or eliminating some common barriers to finding 
jobs (e.g., transportation issues). From an organizational perspective, the “test 
anywhere–anytime” approach may (a) reduce costs associated with onsite testing (e.g., 
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space, staff, and production costs), (b) reduce time–to–hire, and (c) increase the size of 
the hiring organization’s applicant pool, and subsequently improve the selection ratio. 
Consequently, it is expected that the use of unproctored internet–based testing will 
continue to increase and play an important role in employment testing (Tippins et al., 
2006). 
 However, to capitalize on the noted advantages of the “test anywhere–anytime” 
approach, internet–based tests must be administered in an unproctored manner.1 Yet, 
unproctored testing engenders disadvantages that potentially compromise the integrity of 
unproctored internet–based test scores and hence, the resultant researcher and 
practitioner concerns about this mode of testing. Possible threats that result from the use 
of unproctored internet–based testing include the inability to verify the test taker’s 
identity, test content security concerns, and technologically– and psychologically–based 
sources of construct irrelevant variance (Messick, 1995). 
 There are available technologies that are intended to minimize the threats 
concerning test taker identity and test content security. For example, practitioners may 
use webcams, keystroke analysis, or biometric identification systems, such as iris, retina, 
or fingerprint scans, in an attempt to verify test takers’ identities. Furthermore, other 
layers of security for online testing, including electronic monitoring and control such as 
real–time data forensics, browser lockdown, and desktop control, may increase test 
content security and decrease access to illicit aides such as other internet sites (Foster, 
2008; see also Burke, 2008). However, these technologies have some disadvantages, 
                                                 
1
 The term “unproctored” is used here to refer to a lack or absence of human observation of test takers. 
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including concerns regarding cost and applicant reactions to the testing process and 
invasive technologies (Foster, 2008). Furthermore, these possible solutions are state–of–
the–art and may not be a viable option for all organizations due to administrative 
challenges (e.g., administrative cost and required expertise). 
 Concerns regarding test content security and test taker identification 
notwithstanding, technologically–based sources of construct irrelevant variance also 
compromise the veracity of unproctored internet–based test scores. The speed and 
performance properties of the test taker’s computer and the quality of their connection to 
the internet will affect how fast web pages (i.e., test items) are loaded and subsequently, 
the amount of time the test taker has to complete the test (Potosky & Bobko, 2004). 
Furthermore, the performance properties of the server on which the test content resides 
may also affect the speed at which test items are loaded. 
 Finally, two major sources of construct irrelevant variance in this context are the 
lack of standardization in the physical test taking environment, and the opportunity for 
malfeasant behavior. Specifically, the physical context in which applicants complete 
unproctored–internet based tests is not standardized. Applicants may be at a 
disadvantage when taking tests, if for example, they are distracted by ambient noise 
(e.g., crying children) whereas others take the test in a quiet environment. This lack of 
standardization raises questions about whether unproctored internet–based tests meet the 
levels of standardization required by professional guidelines (Pearlman, 2009). 
 Although there are a plethora of concerns regarding unproctored internet–based 
testing, the focus of the present paper is the magnitude and extent of malfeasant behavior 
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and its potential effects on the veracity of test scores. Malfeasant behavior is defined 
here as deliberately falsifying one's responses on a test in an attempt to distort one's 
standing on the construct of interest. Malfeasant responding may take one of two forms 
—cheating or response distortion. In reference to cheating, test takers may employ illicit 
aids such as calculators and dictionaries, alternate test takers (e.g., an intelligent friend), 
or pre–knowledge of test items that have been downloaded (printed) from the testing 
website. In contrast, response distortion refers to deliberately falsifying one's responses 
as in faking, impression management, and other forms of socially desirable responding 
(Paulhus, 2002). Consequently, the primary objective of the present study is to 
investigate and compare potential malfeasance effects on the scores of unproctored 
internet–based tests of cognitive ability, and personality. 
Ability Testing 
 Ability tests are generally considered to be one of the best predictors of job 
performance (Schmidt, 2002; Schmidt & Hunter, 1998). Given their typical format (e.g., 
paper–and–pencil, computer–based) they are also inexpensive to administer. As a class 
of predictors, ability tests have true correct or incorrect answers. Thus, unlike nonability 
testing where malfeasant responding takes the form of response distortion, malfeasant 
responding occurs in the form of cheating in the context of ability testing. 
 Although the prevalence of cheating in organizational settings is not well 
researched (however, see Burke, 2008), this is less so in the educational literature where 
the prevalence of cheating is known to be widespread. For instance, Chizek (1999) and 
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Whitley (1998) report that approximately half of all college students cheat on an 
examination during their college career. 
 Ability (and knowledge) tests are susceptible to cheating for several reasons. 
First, test takers’ scores play an important role in whether they get hired or not. Second, 
the transparency and valence of ability test items are clear—that is, ability test items 
have a correct or best answer. Unlike personality measures, the desired response is a 
matter of fact. Consequently, it is not unreasonable to assume that cheating can and does 
occur in applicant testing. 
 In an unproctored environment, cheating may consist of using crib sheets, 
viewing other test takers’ responses, and communicating with other individuals. Proctors 
deter such forms of cheating insofar as they are able to prevent and detect such 
behaviors. Thus, human observation is the primary method for curtailing cheating. 
However, human proctors are not perfect and some fraction of cheating behavior goes 
undetected. Although there is no empirical evidence describing the relationship between 
cheating and the criterion–related validity of test scores, cheating would have a 
detrimental effect on the criterion–related validity of test scores if only a subset of test 
takers engaged in cheating behaviors or if some test takers were able to cheat better than 
others (i.e., differential score inflation across test takers). 
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Unproctored Internet–Based Ability Tests 
 As previously mentioned, ability tests utilize proctors to deter test takers from 
cheating. In an unproctored environment2, the absence of a proctor may create a 
permissive environment for cheating as test takers may experience little or no fear of 
detection. Motivated test takers may seek out illicit aids, including alternate test takers, 
reference materials, calculators and the like and use these illicit aides to increase their 
test scores. 
 The potential for wide–scale cheating initially led several researchers to suspect 
that unproctored internet–based ability testing may not a viable selection strategy 
(Tippins et al., 2006). However, there are potential methods for detecting and reducing 
the propensity of cheating. These methods include technological solutions as previously 
noted (e.g., browser lockdown, desktop control) as well as proctored retesting (i.e., 
confirmation or verification tests), and using a speeded test. 
 Detecting cheating via proctored retesting. In an effort to utilize unproctored 
internet–based testing and maintain test utility and validity, some researchers advocate 
the use of proctored retesting (Tippins et al., 2006). Using unproctored internet–based 
testing in conjunction with proctored retesting is advantageous over proctored testing 
alone as it reduces the number of applicants who must be tested onsite. Nevertheless, 
proctored retesting does reduce the efficiency and advantages of unproctored internet–
based testing, especially its cost effectiveness. Along these lines, Tippins et al. discuss 
four approaches to unproctored internet–based testing for selection purposes and 
                                                 
2
 It is important to note that the mode of testing (e.g., paper–and–pencil, computer–based, internet–based) 
is independent of the presence or absence of a test proctor. 
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delineate the tradeoffs associated with each approach. One approach is to use 
unproctored internet–based testing to deliver feedback to applicants regarding their 
likely performance on subsequent proctored retesting. Two approaches require proctored 
retesting, taking the form of a full length retest (i.e., repeating the original tests or taking 
alternate forms) or an abridged retest. The fourth approach entails unproctored internet–
based testing without retesting, although this may result in poor test score validity as this 
approach is the most permissive for cheating. 
 In addition to the reduced efficiency of proctored retesting, research indicates 
that retesting is associated with increases in test scores (Hausknecht, Halpert, Di Paolo, 
& Moriarty Gerrard, 2007) and changes in the factor structure of ability tests (Lievens, 
Reeve, & Heggestad, 2007). Hausknecht et al.’s (2007) meta–analytic evidence suggests 
that in operational contexts test takers increase their scores .27 standard deviations upon 
retest (k = 19, N = 61,795). Furthermore, the retesting effect in the absence of coaching 
(in both research and operational contexts) is similar (d = 0.21, k = 75, N = 81,374). 
Based on this evidence, Hausknecht et al. recommend a minimum retest interval of 1 
year to minimize practice effects due to memory—a recommendation that is probably 
not viable in most selection contexts. Furthermore, test scores based on a retest of 
general mental ability (GMA) are less saturated with GMA (and less predictive of grade 
point average) than initial test scores (Lievens et al., 2007). Thus, the use of proctored 
retesting may threaten construct– and criterion–related validity of test scores gathered 
under this approach. 
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 Preventing cheating via speeded ability test. The primary reason for onsite 
retesting of unproctored internet–based tests is to diminish the threat of cheating on the 
part of the test taker and subsequently, scores that do not reflect the individual’s standing 
on the construct of interest. Thus, the need for retesting individuals would be mitigated if 
one used testing approaches that were less susceptible to cheating. One such approach is 
to use speeded tests, which by virtue of their time constraints do not facilitate expected 
cheating behaviors. This is predicated on the assumption that a speeded administration is 
consonant with the job–relatedness of the test3. Possible modes of cheating (e.g., using 
surrogate test takers, using additional aids) are not independent of time, assuming there 
is no pre–knowledge of test content. For example, pertinent information in dictionaries 
and reference materials must be located and read, which may take more time than is 
permitted. Thus, if test takers do not have pre–knowledge of the test content, then time 
constraints should make cheating more difficult, thereby deterring test takers from 
engaging in cheating under speeded conditions. Thus, time constraints may reduce the 
propensity of some forms of cheating (i.e., those that are dependent on time). 
Nonability Testing 
 As a class of tests that are typically administered by means of self–report, there 
are no true correct or incorrect, or even best answers for nonability measures. Therefore, 
in the absence of true correct or incorrect answers, coupled with the inability to verify 
the accuracy of test takers’ responses, nonability measures are susceptible to test takers’ 
                                                 
3
 In the United States, users of speeded tests should also consider the implications of the Americans with 
Disabilities Act. Specifically, some test takers may require some accommodation in the form of additional 
time to complete the test. 
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self–deception or impression management efforts (Edens & Arthur, 2000). As a result, 
there has been increasing interest regarding the issue of test takers’ response distortion 
when nonability tests are used for selection and other employment–related decision 
making (e.g., Cullen, Sackett, & Lievens, 2006; Levashina, & Campion, 2007; Schmitt 
& Kunce, 2002). Paulhus (2002) highlights the distinction between self–deception and 
impression management as facets of socially desirable responding. Socially desirable 
responding is the tendency to over–report socially desirable personal characteristics and 
to under–report socially undesirable characteristics. It entails the inclination to choose 
particular responses even if they do not represent one’s true disposition or opinion. As a 
facet or dimension of socially desirable responding, self–deception occurs when an 
individual unconsciously views himself or herself in an inaccurately favorable light; this 
is typically due to a lack of self–awareness by the respondent. In contrast, impression 
management or deliberate response distortion refers to a situation in which an individual 
consciously presents himself or herself falsely to create a favorable impression. 
 Personnel researchers have used a variety of terms and labels to describe 
response distortion. Some of these terms include social desirability, faking, impression 
management, lying, honesty, frankness, claiming unlikely virtues, denying common 
faults and unpopular attitudes, exaggerating personal strengths, good impression, and 
self–enhancement. Although there are subtle distinctions between these descriptive 
labels, for the purposes of this thesis, the term “response distortion” is used and is 
defined as a conscious attempt on the part of test takers to manipulate their responses in 
order to create an overly positive impression which deviates from their true standing on 
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the trait or characteristic of interest (Ellingson, Sackett, & Connelly, 2007; McFarland & 
Ryan, 2000; Zickar & Robie, 1999). Response distortion is commonly conceptualized as 
systematic error variance (Arthur, Woehr, & Graziano, 2001). Thus, job applicants are 
assumed to distort their responses because it assists them in attaining valued outcomes 
such as jobs and promotions. 
 In spite of the minority claims that few applicants distort their responses (Hogan, 
Barrett, & Hogan, 2007; Hough et al., 1990), the preponderance of recent research 
indicates that applicant response distortion on nonability measures does occur (Griffith, 
Chmielowski, & Yoshita, 2007; Levin & Zickar, 2002). As a result, several techniques 
for preventing or minimizing response distortion on personality measures have been 
investigated, including forced–choice responses, empirical keying, warning and 
verification, and response elaboration (see Hough, 1998 for a review). These techniques 
are designed to decrease the magnitude and extent of response distortion, as these are 
critical factors in determining the adverse effects of response distortion on the criterion–
related validity of test scores (Komar, Brown, Komar, & Robie, 2008). 
Unproctored Internet–Based Nonability Testing 
 The resultant critical question is whether unproctored internet–based personality 
testing results in greater levels of response distortion compared to proctored testing. 
Response distortion is posited to be determined by one’s motivation, ability, the 
opportunity to fake (e.g., test takers with a lower true score have a greater opportunity to 
fake compared to test takers with a higher true score), and situational factors (McFarland 
& Ryan, 2006). In an unproctored environment access to illicit aides may create a 
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relatively more permissive environment compared to proctored testing as test takers may 
collaborate with other individuals (e.g., alternate test takers, surrogates or advisors) in an 
effort to inflate their test scores. However, it is unlikely that test takers will engage in 
these behaviors if they are confident in their ability to elevate their test scores using their 
own personal schemas of a desirable personality profile. Given the preponderance of 
research that indicates test takers can effectively distort their responses (Viswesvaran & 
Ones, 1999), it is not unreasonable to posit that test takers are unlikely to seek out illicit 
aides (e.g., alternate test takers). Thus, the magnitude and extent of response distortion 
should be similar for both unproctored internet–based and proctored personality tests. 
Testing Stakes 
 Test outcomes, that is high– versus low–stakes testing (Birkeland et al., 2006; 
Ellingson et al., 2007), may also affect the propensity for malfeasance. A test 
administration is considered to have high–stakes when the results of the test have 
“important, direct consequences for examinees, programs, or institutions involved in 
testing” (AERA et al., 1999, p. 121). Thus, high–stakes testing (e.g., selection and other 
employment–related testing) would be expected to increase the motivation for 
malfeasance whereas low–stakes testing (e.g., for developmental or research purposes) 
should result in relatively little, if any cheating or response distortion. In high–stakes 
testing, test scores are used to make comparative evaluative decisions regarding who to 
hire or the allotment of other valued outcomes (e.g., promotions in municipal merit–
based personnel systems). When used for these purposes, the test takers’ livelihoods are 
affected by decisions made on the basis of their test scores. Thus, it is reasonable to 
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assume that high–stakes testing will result in more malfeasant behavior (cheating and 
response distortion) relative to low–stakes testing due to the outcomes associated with 
the test scores. Taken together, unproctored internet–based testing using a cognitive 
ability test in a high–stakes setting should elicit the highest levels of malfeasant 
behavior, compared to, for example, using personality tests in low–stakes settings. 
 However, it is worth noting that differences in retest scores from an unproctored 
internet–based ability test may result from two distinct sources. Classic psychometric 
theory would suggest that retest scores should increase as a function of practice effects. 
Therefore, regardless of testing–stakes, retest scores should be higher than initial scores 
due to prior exposure to the test. Alternatively, a malfeasance perspective would predict 
lower scores in low–stakes conditions due to decreased motivation to engage in 
malfeasance. Thus, a comparison of repeated test scores obtained under high– versus 
low–stakes testing addresses whether a psychometric practice effect or malfeasance 
explanation best accounts for observed differences in the cognitive ability test scores. As 
previously mentioned, the use of a speeded ability test should mitigate the likelihood of 
test takers engaging in cheating behaviors, thus retest score changes should be best 
accounted for by a psychometric rather than a malfeasance explanation. 
 In summary, the objectives of the present study were to: 
1. Investigate whether unproctored and proctored cognitive ability tests differed in 
terms of retest score changes and to investigate whether observed retest score 
changes could be best accounted for by a cheating or psychometric retest 
explanation. 
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2. Investigate whether unproctored and proctored personality tests differed in terms 
of the magnitude of response distortion. Specifically, do unproctored internet–
based personality tests display higher levels of response distortion than proctored 
tests? In addition, do unproctored internet–based personality tests result in more 
test takers distorting their responses compared to proctored personality tests? 
 To accomplish the objectives of the present study, a within–subjects design was 
implemented in which 296 test takers completed an unproctored online assessment that 
included a cognitive ability, and personality test. Participants completed the measures 
first as job applicants (high–stakes) or incumbents (low–stakes), then as research 
participants (low–stakes). Meta–analytic results reported in the extant literature were 
used for the proctored ability (Hausknecht, et al., 2007) and personality (Birkeland et al., 
2006) test comparisons. Furthermore, results reported by Griffith et al. (2007; a primary 
study) were used to compare the frequency of applicant response distortion in proctored 
and unproctored settings. The results of these studies are briefly reviewed below. 
 The results of Hausknecht et al.’s (2007) meta–analysis of practice effects on 
proctored cognitive ability tests indicated retest improvements in scores both in the 
presence (d = 0.64, k = 23, N = 2,323) and absence (d = 0.21, k = 75, N = 81,374) of 
interventions such as test coaching and training. In addition, the mean improvement in 
test scores under operational (d = 0.27, k = 19, N = 61,795) and research–based (d = 
0.22, k = 88, N = 72,641) testing conditions were quite similar. It should be noted that 
unlike the present study, the testing conditions for the test and retest were identical. 
Thus, for the operational setting both conditions were high–stakes, and for the research 
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conditions both were low–stakes. Although the operational data are much closer to the 
study objectives, both the operational and research–based results from Hausknecht et 
al.’s meta–analysis will be used to make comparisons. Finally, Hausknecht et al. also 
obtained fairly high retest reliability coefficients (mean Test 1/Test 2 = .82, Test 2/Test 3 
= .83, and Test 1/Test 3 = .82; J. P. Hausknecht, personal communication, 2007). 
 Birkeland et al. (2006) investigated job applicant faking on personality measures 
by comparing applicants’ and incumbents’ scores on the five factor model (FFM) of 
personality dimensions. In conducting their meta–analysis, they drew the distinction 
between direct and indirect measures of the FFM dimensions, where direct measures 
were defined as those that were specifically designed to measure the FFM personality 
factors (e.g., NEO–FFI). In contrast, indirect measures were not (e.g., the 16PF) but 
could be and were reclassified into the FFM personality dimensions. Birkeland et al.’s 
general conclusion was that the sample–weighted mean differences between applicants 
and incumbents (which was inferred to represent faking) was a function of the 
personality dimension and the test type (i.e., direct versus indirect measure). Although 
the current study uses an indirect FFM measure, the results from the present study were 
compared to both Birkeland et al.’s indirect and direct measure results. 
 Griffith et al. (2007) investigated applicant faking on a measure of 
conscientiousness using a within–subjects design where applicants were retested as 
research participants. Specifically, they constructed confidence intervals around the 
participants’ honest scores (i.e., their retest scores) and inferred faking if the 
participants’ scores as applicants fell outside the specified band. As a result, 49%, 31%, 
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and 22% of the participants were labeled as fakers using confidence intervals of .5SD, 
the standard error of measurement, and the standard error of the difference. 
17 
 
CHAPTER II 
METHOD 
 
Participants 
 The study sample was obtained by emailing 9,426 individuals who had 
previously completed the cognitive ability and personality tests as part of an unproctored 
internet–based assessment system developed and implemented by a large testing firm. 
The first administration was for either selection (i.e., test takers were applicants) or 
profile development purposes (i.e., test takers were incumbents). Out of the 9,426 
individuals contacted, 296 agreed to participate in the study by completing the tests a 
second time (also online). Participants must have completed the tests at least one year 
prior to the second administration to be invited to participate. This resulted in a response 
rate of 3.14%. Test 1 scores were available for all 9,426 individuals, including those who 
chose not to participate in the follow–up investigation. Comparisons between those who 
participated and those who did not are presented in Table 1. The mean age of the 
participants at Test 1 was 35.53 (SD = 10.67). Of the participants (Test 2), 149 were 
women and 136 were men. Eleven participants did not report their sex. There were 234 
Caucasians, 24 Asians, 16 African–Americans, 11 Hispanics, and 1 American Indian. 
Nine participants reported their race as “other”, and 1 participant did not report her/his 
race. The participants’ employment status at Test 2 was 239 full–time, 21 part–time, 22 
unemployed, and 13 self–employed with 1 individual not responding. Participants were 
compensated with a movie ticket (n = 19), $10 gift card (n = 31), $20 (n = 14), or $20 
18 
 
gift card (n = 230) for participating in the study (i.e., Test 2). Two participants did not 
receive any compensation for participation. 
 Because the testing firm uses the tests for a wide range of positions for their 
clients, the participants represented a variety of jobs in a number of organizations. 
Although the specific job titles for the positions to which they applied were not 
available, Table 2 presents the frequencies for the Standard Occupational Classification 
(SOC) major groups and the North American Industry Classification System (NAICS) 
industry types represented in the data at Test 2. The data in Table 2 are limited to only 
instances in which the participant’s organization (at Test 2) was a client of the testing 
organization. 
 The average Test 1/Test 2 retest interval was 429.16 days (SD = 54.84, median = 
419.50). The difference between the retest interval for the 2 conditions (applicants 
versus incumbents) was not significant, t (294) = 1.55, p > .05, d = 0.28. In addition, the 
differences between Test 1 and Test 2 scores were not related to the participants’ retest 
interval (cognitive ability = –.06, agreeableness = .01, conscientiousness = –.02, 
emotional stability = –.01, openness = –.05, and extraversion = –.13 [p < .05]). 
Measures 
 Cognitive ability test. The cognitive ability test (Arthur, 2004) was a proprietary 
internet–based speeded test that consisted of 120 4–alternative multiple choice items 
with verbal (64 items) and numeric (56 items) sub–scales. Participants had 20 minutes to 
complete the test. The test was scored as the percentage of items answered correctly.  
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Table 1 
 
Demography and Test 1 Scores for Participants and Nonparticipants 
 
 Participants  Nonparticipants    
Variable Mean SD  Mean SD  d  
Cognitive Ability 61.38 16.86   53.79 17.04   0.45 * 
Agreeableness 60.47 16.57   61.95 18.12   -0.09  
Conscientiousness 73.11 10.09   74.56 9.37   -0.15 * 
Emotional Stability 76.42 15.34   77.95 14.36   -0.10  
Extraversion 63.35 13.26   62.30 13.26   0.08  
Openness 50.23 9.55   47.39 10.06   0.29 * 
Age 35.53 10.67   35.15 10.63   0.04  
Percent women 52.28   45.37   — 
Percent men 47.72   54.63   — 
 
Note.  Participant n = 296; Nonparticipant n = 9,130. Age descriptive statistics are based 
upon the 294 and 8,680 individuals who provided their age in the participant and 
nonparticipant samples, respectively. Sex descriptive statistics are based upon the 285 
and 9,053 individuals who provided their sex in the participant and nonparticipant 
samples, respectively. A chi–square test indicated women were more likely to agree to 
participate than men, χ (1, N = 9338) = 5.33, p < .05. ds were computed such that the 
nonparticipant sample's score was subtracted from the participant sample's score so a 
positive d indicates that the participant sample's score was greater than the 
nonparticipant sample's score. *p < .05, two-tailed. 
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Table 2 
 
Frequency of the SOC Major Groups and the NAICS Industry Types in the Test 2 Data 
 
Standard Occupational Classification (SOC) titles Frequency 
Management occupations 
Business and financial operations occupations 
Computer and mathematical occupations 
Architecture and engineering occupations 
Community and social services occupations 
Education, training and library occupations 
Arts, design, entertainment, sports, and media occupations 
Healthcare practitioners and technical occupations 
Healthcare support occupations 
Food preparation and serving related occupations 
Personal care and service occupations 
Sales and related occupations 
Office and administrative support occupations 
Construction and extraction occupations 
Installation, maintenance, and repair occupations 
Transportation and material moving occupations 
Military specific occupations 
66 
6 
4 
1 
– 
– 
1 
– 
2 
– 
– 
13 
3 
– 
– 
– 
– 
North American Industry Classification System (NAICS) titles  
Manufacturing 
Wholesale retail 
Retail trade 
Transportation and warehousing 
Information 
Finance and insurance 
Real estate and rental and leasing 
Professional, scientific, and technical services 
Administrative and support and waste management and remediation services 
Healthcare and social assistance 
Accommodation and food services 
Other services (except public administration) 
22 
7 
5 
– 
– 
35 
– 
15 
– 
6 
9 
– 
Note. These data are limited to only the instances in which participant’s organization (at Test 2) 
was a client of the testing organization. 
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Arthur (2005) reported retest reliability coefficients of .88 (total), .86 (verbal), and .87 
(math) over a relatively short retest interval (M = 16.18 days, SD = 19.48 days, and Mdn 
= 7.00 days). Arthur (2004) also reported correlations of .72 and .54 with the Thurston 
Test of Mental Alertness and SAT scores, respectively.  
 Personality test. The personality test was an internet–based untimed version of 
the Guilford–Zimmerman Temperament Survey (Guilford, Zimmerman, & Guilford, 
1976) and the Differential Personality Inventory (Jackson & Messick, 1964). The 
Guilford–Zimmerman consisted of 9 scales and a total of 110 items. The Differential 
Factors consisted of 8 scales and 95 items. Each item consisted of a statement and the 
test takers indicated whether the statement described them or not (i.e., dichotomously 
scored). 
 In order to make meaningful comparisons between the results of this study and 
Birkeland et al.’s (2006) meta–analytic results, the scales used in this study were sorted 
into the FFM dimensions using the processes, guidelines, and information presented in 
Barrick and Mount (1991) and Birkeland et al. (2006). The Guilford–Zimmerman 
Temperament Survey has previously been sorted into the FFM (Barrick & Mount, 1991). 
However, the Differential Personality Inventory had not been previously sorted into the 
FFM. Therefore, 9 senior Ph.D. students independently sorted the Differential 
Personality Inventory scales into the FFM. Raters were provided with a list of the scales 
and their definitions and were instructed to assign each scale to one of the five 
dimensions, and indicate their confidence of the accuracy of their rating on a scale from 
0 to 100. Next, the raters met to discuss any discrepancies. If at least six of the nine 
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raters agreed on a dimension, the scale was classified in that dimension. As a result, 
seven of the nine scales were classified into the FFM. The remaining two scales and 
their constituent items were reviewed by two Ph.D. students and a faculty member. A 
scale was classified if consensus was reached. This resulted in the classification of the 
two remaining scales (see Appendix A). 
 The number of items and internal consistency coefficients for the FFM 
dimension scores are presented in Table 3. The mean completion times for Test 1 
(participants only) of the Guilford–Zimmerman was 114.25 minutes (SD = 1006.5. 
median = 12.00) and was 65.38 minutes (SD = 693.65, median = 9.00) for the 
Differential Personality Inventory. The mean completion times for Test 2 were 150.84 
minutes (SD = 919.78, median = 9.00) and 14.13 minutes (SD = 68.03, median = 7.00) 
for the Guilford–Zimmerman and Differential Personality Inventory, respectively. 
Procedure 
 For both test administrations, participants completed the cognitive ability and 
personality tests under unproctored internet–based testing conditions. That is, they 
logged on to the internet test site whenever they wanted, from any computer, and from 
any location of their choosing. As previously noted, test takers who had previously 
completed the tests, either as applicants (Test 1, high–stakes) or incumbents who were 
requested by their company to complete the measure to generate a profile (Test 1, low–
stakes), were invited via e–mail to retake the tests as research participants. To be invited 
to participate in the study, participants must have completed testing at least one year  
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Table 3 
 
FFM Dimensions Descriptive Statistics and Internal Consistency Reliability Coefficients 
 
 HL  LL 
 Test 1  Test 2  Test 1  Test 2 
FFM Dimension 
# of 
items 
M SD α  M SD α  M SD α  M SD α 
Agreeableness 22 60.89 16.65 .70  48.61 20.44 .79  58.10 16.06 .68  50.83 17.80 .71 
Conscientiousness 58 73.75 09.78 .73  65.13 13.77 .81  69.46 11.17 .70  65.70 11.81 .72 
Emotional Stability 20 76.87 15.18 .72  64.09 19.85 .78  73.86 16.13 .74  72.05 17.03 .74 
Extraversion 54 63.09 13.14 .81  58.84 14.39 .83  64.83 13.99 .83  62.09 14.47 .83 
Openness 51 50.04 09.36 .68  52.77 11.00 .68  50.88 10.71 .73  49.73 10.71 .70 
 
Note. N = 296, HL n = 252, LL n = 44. Test 1 internal consistency estimates for the total sample (i.e., HL + LL) were .69 for 
agreeableness, .73 for conscientiousness, .72 for emotional stability, .81 for extraversion, and .61 for openness. Test 2 internal 
consistency estimates for the total sample (i.e., HL + LL) were .78 for agreeableness, .80 for conscientiousness, .78 for 
emotional stability, .83 for extraversion, and .68 for openness. 
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prior to the second administration. Because Test 2 assessment was for research purposes 
and all participants were informed of such when they were recruited, the Test 2 
assessment was considered to be low–stakes. This created two groups of participants. 
Applicants were considered to have experienced high–stakes testing and low–stakes 
retesting (i.e., HL–stakes, n = 252) and incumbents were posited to have experienced 
low–stakes during both testing and retesting (i.e., LL–stakes, n = 44). Consequently, the 
LL–stakes group was considered to have the least incentive to engage in malfeasant 
behaviors during the initial test (Test 1), thus the Test 1/Test 2 difference scores should 
be relatively small compared to the HL–stakes group. 
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CHAPTER III 
RESULTS 
 
Potential Cheating on Ability Test 
 Effect of potential cheating on ability test score changes. The observed retest 
reliabilities of the cognitive ability test scores were .78, .77, and .84 for the total sample, 
HL, and LL participants, respectively (see Table 4). These values are well within the 
range of those reported by Hausknecht et al. (2007). Table 4 also presents the 
standardized mean differences between the Test 1 and Test 2 cognitive ability test 
scores. The results generally indicate that the retest improvements in test scores were 
moderate and generally larger than those reported by Hausknecht et al. 
 A 2 (Group) × 2 (Administration) mixed analysis of variance (ANOVA) was 
used to investigate group mean differences. The between–subjects main effect was 
nonsignificant indicating that participants across the two groups (HL, LL) did not differ 
in their overall cognitive ability test scores (F(1,294) = 101, p > .05, η2 = .00). However, 
the within–subjects effect was significant (F (1,294) = 64.35, p < .05, η2 = .18), indicating 
an increase in overall cognitive ability test scores from Test 1 to Test 2. Finally, overall 
cognitive ability test scores did not increase differentially between groups, that is, the 
Group × Administration interaction was not significant (F (1,294) = 1.72, p > .05, η2 = .00). 
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Table 4 
 
Comparison of Cognitive Ability (Unproctored) Test–Retest Standardized Mean 
Differences (d) and Reliability Coefficients with Hausknecht et al. (2007) Meta–Analytic 
Results 
 
 
Unproctored 
 Proctored 
(Hausknecht et al.) 
 Total HL LL  OpA RschB 
Cognitive ability  
Test 2–Test 1 d 
 
0.39* 
 
0.36* 
 
0.57* 
  
0.27 
 
0.22 
Retest reliability .78 .77 .84  .82C 
 
Note. N = 296, HL n = 252, LL n = 44. ds were computed by subtracting the Test 1 
scores from the Test 2 scores so a positive d indicates that the Test 2 score is greater than 
the Test 1 score. AOperational data; Bresearch–based data. CHausknecht et al. do not 
present an operational/research retest reliability breakdown thus, the reliability estimate 
is for both settings. For comparative purposes, the mean retest interval for the current 
study was 429.16 days (SD = 54.84, Mdn = 54.84); in contrast, Hausknecht et al. report a 
mean of 134.52 days (SD = 304.67, Mdn = 20.00). * p < .05, two–tailed. 
 
 
 To further investigate how participants differed in their responses across the two 
administrations of the cognitive ability test, the standard error of measurement of the 
difference scores (SEMd) was used to identify individuals who may have engaged in 
malfeasance. The SEMd provides an estimate of the range of fluctuation that is likely to 
occur between two observed scores, both containing measurement error (e.g., regression 
toward the mean). Thus, it represents an estimate of the standard deviation of the normal 
distribution of difference scores that an individual would have obtained if he/she took a 
test, in principle, an infinite number of times (Gulliksen, 1950). 
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 In computing the SEMd, the correlation between the scores of the two 
administrations (test–retest reliability) was used as the reliability estimate and the 
observed standard deviation of the difference scores as the variability estimate. 
Specifically, the formula presented by Dudek (1979 [see Equation 3]; see also Hogan et 
al., [2007]) was used and is presented in Equation 1 below and the resultant values are 
presented in Table 5. 
(1) 
where 
sd = the standard deviation of the Test 2−Test 1 difference score 
rx1x2 = the Test 1/Test 2 correlation. 
 
Table 5 
 
Test 2/Test 1 Difference Score Means and Standard Deviations, Test–Retest 
Correlations, and SEMd Values 
 
Variable M SD rx1x2 SEMd 
Cognitive Ability 6.81  11.76  .78 7.6 
Agreeableness –11.54  18.06  .53 15.31 
Conscientiousness –7.90  11.79  .53 10.00 
Emotional Stability –11.15  18.08  .49 15.76 
Extraversion –4.03  10.21  .73 6.98 
Openness 2.08  8.48  .67 6.30 
 
Note. N = 296. 
SED = sd √1–rx1x2 
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 Next, the differences between individuals’ Test 2 and Test 1 scores were 
examined to determine whether the score changes fell above, below, or within 1 SEMd. 
This approach resulted in three categories of test patterns. Differences between Test 2 
and Test 1 scores that fell within the band (i.e., Test 2 test score did not differ from the 
Test 1 test score) were considered to be evidence of stability. Differences between Test 2 
and Test 1 scores that fell above the band (i.e., Test 2 test score was greater than the Test 
1 score) were considered to be evidence of a practice effect, whereas differences 
between Test 2 and Test 1 scores that fell below the band (i.e., Test 2 score was lower 
than the Test 1 test score) were considered to be evidence of malfeasance. The results of 
this categorization, which are presented in Figure 1, show that the preponderance of 
changes in test scores (49.32%) were indicative of a practice effect (Test 2 score was 
greater than the Test 1 score). The results also show that 42.91% of the test score 
changes were within 1 SEMd. In contrast, only 7.77% of the scores were indicative of 
malfeasance. Consequently, for 92.23% of the participants, the pattern of their test score 
differences are more in line with a psychometric than a malfeasance explanation and do 
not support the presence of wide–scale score inflation on this speeded ability test as a 
result of high–stakes testing. This pattern of results is similar to results reported by Nye, 
Do, Drasgow, and Fine (2008) for a perceptual speed test. 
 In interpreting these data, it should be noted that lower Test 2 scores (which is 
inferred to be “cheating”) could be due to (1) the Test 1 score being elevated due to 
cheating and the Test 2 score being the “true” score, or (2) the Test 1 score being the 
“true” score and the Test 2 score being an unmotivated test performance score (i.e., the 
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participant did not take the test seriously). Given the design, it is not possible to 
distinguish or differentiate between these two causes or explanations of the observed 
score difference. Consequently, the percentage of cheaters in the sample conceivably 
ranges from 0% (all lower Test 2 scores are to due explanation #2) to 7.7% (all lower 
Test 2 scores are due to explanation #1). Hence, 7.7% might be best viewed as the upper 
limit of cheating in this sample. It is worth noting however, that the mean number of 
items attempted increased from Time 1 to Time 2 suggesting that participants were 
motivated during retesting (see Table 6). 
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Figure 1. Percentage of test takers as per 1 SEMd operationalization of practice and 
cheating effects on the cognitive ability test. ATMA = Total scale; ATMA–V = Verbal 
sub–scale; ATMA–N = Numeric sub–scale. 
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Table 6 
 
Number of Test Items Attempted on Cognitive Ability Test and Retest 
 
 Test 1  Test 2    
Group Mean SD  Mean SD  d 
Total 73.09 18.18  84.33 20.44  0.58* 
HL 72.89 18.68  83.90 20.92  0.56* 
LL 74.23 15.23  86.82 17.43  0.77* 
 
Note. Total number of items = 120; N = 296, HL n = 252, LL n = 44. ds were computed 
by subtracting the number of items attempted for Test 1 from the number of items 
attempted for Test 2 so a positive d indicates that more items were attempted during Test 
2 compared to Test 1. 
*p < .05, two–tailed. 
 
 
 
 Effect of potential cheating on psychometric properties. To investigate the effect 
of potential malfeasance on the psychometric properties of the cognitive ability test 
scores, the test–retest reliability coefficients were computed for each group (HL rxx = 
.77, LL rxx = .84). The difference between the reliability coefficients for the groups was 
also tested using Fisher’s r to z transformation. This comparison failed to indicate a 
significant difference (zr = 0.42, p > .05). 
Potential Response Distortion on the Personality Measures 
 Effect of potential response distortion on FFM scores changes. The retest 
reliability coefficients for the FFM scores and the standardized mean differences 
between the Test 1 and Test 2 FFM scores are presented in Table 7. When compared to 
Birkeland et al.’s (2006) results for indirect measures, the retest effects for these data 
were generally larger. However, this pattern of results is consistent with the finding (see 
Edens & Arthur, 2000, and Viswesvaran & Ones, 1999) that larger response distortion
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Table 7 
 
Comparison of FFM Dimensions (Unproctored) Test–Retest Standardized Mean Differences (d) and Reliability Coefficients 
with Birkeland et al. (2006) Meta–Analytic Results 
 
 
Unproctored 
 Proctored 
(Birkeland et al.) 
FFM Dimensions Total  HL  LL  Direct Indirect 
Agreeableness –0.63* (.53)  –0.66* (.53)  –0.43* (.56)  –0.51 0.15 
Conscientiousness –0.66* (.53)  –0.72* (.55)  –0.33* (.49)  –0.79 –0.15 
Emotional Stability –0.63* (.49)  –0.72* (.51)  –0.11  (.50)  –0.72 –0.24 
Extraversion –0.29* (.73)  –0.31* (.70)  –0.19* (.87)  –0.18 –0.07 
Openness –0.20* (.67)  –0.26* (.66)  –0.11  (.75)  –0.28 –0.02 
 
Note. N = 296, HL n = 252, LL n = 44. ds were computed by subtracting the Test 1 scores from the Test 2 scores so a positive 
d indicates that the Test 2 score is greater than the Test 1 score. Test–retest reliability coefficients are in parenthesis. *p < .05, 
two–tailed. 
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effects are generally obtained for within–subject designs (these data) than between–
subjects designs (Birkeland et al.’s data). However, consistent with Birkeland et al.’s 
findings, the effects were not uniform across all FFM personality dimensions with 
extraversion and openness displaying smaller mean shifts (i.e., less response distortion) 
than agreeableness, conscientiousness, and emotional stability. 
 Five mixed ANOVAs were also conducted, one for each personality factor, to 
test for the statistical significance of the observed mean differences in these data. The 
between–subjects main effects were not significant for all analyses, indicating 
participants across the two groups (HL, LL) did not differ on any of the FFM personality 
dimensions (see Table 3). In addition, with exception of openness (η2 = .00), the with–
subjects effects were significant for all the personality dimensions (η2 = .13, .12, .08, and 
.06 for agreeableness, conscientiousness, emotional stability, and extraversion, 
respectively). Hence, these results indicate that participants’ scores decreased from Test 
1 to Test 2 for all the FFM dimensions except openness. Finally, the Group × 
Administration interaction was significant for conscientiousness (η2 = .02), emotional 
stability (η2 = .04), and openness (η2 = .03), indicating that these factors decreased 
differentially across groups. 
 Next, the SEMd was used to further investigate changes in retest scores. In this 
instance, differences between Test 2 and Test 1 scores that fell within 1 SEMd (i.e., Test 
2 score did not differ from the Test 1 score) were considered to be evidence of stability. 
Differences between Test 2 and Test 1 scores that fell above the SEMd (i.e., Test 2 score 
was greater than Test 1 score) were considered to be indicative of distort–low response 
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distortion on Test 1. In contrast, differences between Test 2 and Test 1 scores that fell 
below the SEMd (i.e., Test 2 score was lower than Test 1 score) were considered to be 
indicative of distort–high response distortion on Test 1. The results of these analyses 
indicate that with the exception of openness, substantially more test takers distorted high 
versus low (see Figure 2 and Table 5). Thus, although most test takers’ scores were 
fairly stable, sizeable percentages of the test takers displayed evidence of higher scores 
on Test 1 than Test 2 (35.81% on agreeableness, 34.12% on conscientiousness, 33.11% 
on emotional stability, 35.81% on extraversion, and 14.53% on openness). Thus, the 
results presented here are slightly larger than the results of Griffith et al.’s (2007) study 
where 22% (compared to 34.12%) of test takers were identified as distorting their 
responses on the first administration of a conscientiousness measure. 
 Effect of potential response distortion on psychometric properties. To investigate 
the effect of potential response distortion on the psychometric properties of the 
personality test scores, differences between the test–retest reliability coefficients for the 
groups were tested using Fisher’s r to z transformation. The comparison indicated only 
extraversion displayed differences in its test–retest reliability coefficient (zr = 2.69, p < 
.05). In addition, the retest reliability coefficients were similar in magnitude and range to 
those reported for proctored tests using similar designs. For example, Ellingson et al. 
(2007) reported average retest reliability coefficients for the California Psychological 
Inventory of .66, .62, .57, and .59 for test takers who experienced LL–, LH–, HL–, and 
LL–stakes testing conditions, respectively. Additionally, Hogan et al. (2007) reported 
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slightly smaller retest reliability coefficients from test takers who experienced HH–
stakes. 
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Figure 2. Percentage of test takers as per 1 SEMd operationalization of response 
distortion on the personality measure. 
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CHAPTER IV 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 
 
 A number of summary statements can be made on the basis of the results 
reported here. First, the use of a speeded unproctored internet–based ability test resulted 
in high–stakes/low–stakes retest effects that were more consonant with a psychometric 
practice effect than a malfeasance explanation. Specifically, consistent with 
psychometric theory, the Test 2 scores were moderately higher than the Test 1 scores (d 
= 0.39). These findings are consistent with those reported by Hausknecht et al. (2007) 
who, in a meta–analysis of 50 organizational and educational studies of practice effects 
for cognitive ability, obtained a d of 0.21 for practice effects without an intervention 
(i.e., no coaching). Furthermore, these results are similar to the findings of Nye et al. 
(2008) who administered a perceptual speed test under high–stakes unproctored 
conditions then under high–stakes proctored (verification testing). Specifically, they 
reported that applicants increased their test score 0.29 SD from Test 1 to Test 2. In the 
current study, the higher Test 2 scores provide more support for a psychometric 
explanation of test score differences than they do for a malfeasance explanation, which if 
supported would have resulted in lower Test 2 scores. In addition, the HL–stakes (n = 
252) and LL–stakes (n = 44) groups represented two sharply contrasted groups. The first 
administration represented an applicant (high–stakes) versus incumbent (low–stakes) 
comparison. Consequently, one would have expected test score differences between 
these two groups to be fairly large. However, statistical comparisons failed to obtain 
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significant differences between them. Furthermore, a relatively small percentage of 
“cheaters” were identified using the SEMd operationalization. Thus, the results do not 
support the presence of widespread score inflation on this speeded ability test as a result 
of high–stakes testing. So, it would seem that the use of speeded tests, assuming they are 
not at odds with the job requirements, might be one means of alleviating cheating 
concerns with unproctored internet–based ability tests. However, although speeded tests 
might mitigate cheating–related behaviors that are time dependent, they may do little to 
preempt the cheating behaviors that are not temporally demanding (e.g., employing 
surrogate test takers or pre–knowledge of test items). 
 Second, because proctoring is not a technique that is intended to prevent or 
minimize response distortion on non–cognitive measures, it was expected that 
unproctored internet–based personality measures would display levels of response 
distortion similar to those reported for proctored measures in the extant literature. 
Specifically, the data reported here display similar standardized mean differences (e.g., 
Birkeland et al., 2006) and similar percentages of “fakers” (Griffith, Chmielowski, & 
Yoshita, 2007) as reported in the extant literature. The results of this study support this 
supposition. Thus, similar to proctored measures, FFM dimension scores were generally 
higher in high–stakes compared to the low–stakes condition. Furthermore, as with 
proctored tests, the magnitude of the score shifts was generally higher for agreeableness, 
conscientiousness, and emotional stability compared to extraversion and openness. 
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Limitations, Implications, and Directions for Future Research 
 The low response rate and self–selective nature of the study sample are potential 
methodological threats. For instance, one could reasonably speculate that compared to 
those who did not engage in malfeasant behaviors in the first administration, individuals 
who did engage in this behavior would be less likely to volunteer to participate in the 
second administration. So, the results of this study must be interpreted within the context 
of this potential threat. Another limitation is that the absence of criterion data did not 
allow for the assessment of the comparative criterion–related validity of the cognitive 
ability and personality test scores under the different testing conditions. The extant 
literature does not address the effects of malfeasance on the criterion–related validity of 
ability tests, however, the effects of response distortion on the criterion–related validity 
of personality scores has received some attention (see Hough, Eaton, Dunnette Kamp, & 
McCloy, 1990; Ones, Viswesvaran, & Reiss, 1996). On the basis of this research, it 
would seem that although the true effect of response distortion on the criterion–related 
validity of personality test scores remains unclear (Birkeland et al., 2006; Hough, 1998; 
Hough et al., 1990; Ones et al., 1996), the impact appears to be low (Schmitt & Oswald, 
2006). Nevertheless, the availability of criterion data would have permitted a further 
assessment of the effects of unproctored high–stakes cognitive ability and personality 
testing. 
 Finally, the data presented here do not directly assess malfeasance or the lack 
thereof. For instance, given the elusive nature of cheating, it is difficult to directly 
measure this behavior. In lieu of this, the focus was on changing the psychological 
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conditions (i.e., perceived stakes), instead of the administration conditions (i.e., 
proctored versus unproctored testing). In addition, the test–retest design used did not 
suffer from the common limitation of using only incumbent data as both applicant and 
incumbent data were included in a within–subjects design. Therefore, changes in test 
scores were a function of changes in either malfeasance patterns or practice effects and 
the presence or absence of said changes was used to make inferences about the levels of 
cheating and response distortion. Consequently, on these bases, for the cognitive ability 
test there was no evidence to indicate that wide–scale or systematic malfeasance unduly 
affected the test scores or their psychometric properties. 
 Likewise, inferences about the presence of response distortion on the personality 
measure were made on the basis of mean shifts in test scores from the high–stakes to 
low–stakes testing conditions, with the expectation that test takers are more likely to 
inflate their scores in high–stakes conditions. Whether the mean shift truly represents 
“faking” or not could be debated. However, irrespective of one’s position on this issue, it 
would not be unreasonable to conclude that the pattern of results obtained for the 
unproctored internet–based personality measure is similar to those reported for proctored 
measures. 
Conclusions 
 The efficacy of unproctored internet–based employment testing is threatened by 
the possible influence of malfeasance on the part of applicants. However, the current 
study provides evidence that even under conditions where it is intuitive to expect 
widespread cheating (i.e., high–stakes unproctored ability testing), there was no 
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discernable effect on test scores when the testing condition was designed to counter such 
behavior. Unproctored internet–based testing using a speeded test format appears to have 
reduced the opportunity for and thus the prevalence of malfeasant behavior. Thus, the 
use of speeded unproctored internet–based ability tests may be an additional option to 
onsite retesting, when a speeded test is consonant with the job relatedness of said tests. 
Similarly, these data suggest that using an unproctored internet–based testing 
administration does not uniquely threaten personality measures in terms of elevated 
levels of response distortion compared to that of proctored tests. Specifically, the pattern 
of high– versus low–stakes retest effects observed for unproctored and proctored 
personality measures are quite similar. 
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APPENDIX A 
 
 
 
Five Factor Model Dimensions Inventory 
Emotional Stability Extraversion Openness Agreeableness Conscientiousness 
Guilford– 
Zimmerman 
Emotional 
Consistency 
Ascendance Thoughtfulness Personal Relations General Activity 
 Objectivity Sociability  Friendliness Restraint 
Differential 
Factors 
 Adventure vs. 
Security 
Likes Thinking  Realistic Thinking 
  Need for Attention Need for Freedom 
from Structure 
 Self–Reliance 
  Need for Diversion Cultural Conformity   
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